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THE COURT AND THE CODE:  
A RESPONSE TO THE WARP AND WOOF OF 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
LAWRENCE ZELENAK† 
Most tax lawyers (myself included) believe there are features of 
the Internal Revenue Code that distinguish the art of interpreting the 
code from the interpretation of most other statutes. It is gratifying 
that the thoughtful and thorough work of Professors James J. 
Brudney and Corey Ditslear1 tends to support that belief, both 
descriptively and normatively. Strictly speaking, Professors Brudney 
and Ditslear establish only that interpreting the code is a different 
exercise from interpreting federal workplace statutes, but most tax 
lawyers would be willing to assume (on perhaps too little evidence) 
that the interpretation of workplace statutes is in the interpretive 
mainstream and that code interpretation is the outlier. In this brief 
Response, I offer a few observations—admittedly, somewhat 
scattershot—on some of the questions considered by Professors 
Brudney and Ditslear. My comments focus on the role of tax 
legislative history in the interpretive process, the usefulness (or lack 
thereof) of tax-specific canons of statutory interpretation, the ability 
of Supreme Court Justices without extensive pre-judicial tax 
backgrounds to write high-quality opinions in tax cases, and the 
limitations of quantitative analysis of judicial opinions. 
I.  QUESTIONING THE EXPERTISE-BORROWING EXPLANATION OF 
THE COURT’S USE OF TAX LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
I agree with Professors Brudney and Ditslear that the quality of 
the committee reports on federal tax legislation—in terms of both 
process and product—is extremely high and that Justice Scalia’s 
arguments for disregarding legislative history are, therefore, 
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particularly weak in the tax context.2 I am not sure, however, that I 
fully agree with Professors Brudney and Ditslear’s expertise-
borrowing description of how the Supreme Court uses the reports of 
the tax writing committees.3 My sense is that even the most expert tax 
lawyers lean very heavily on committee reports in attempting to 
understand tax legislation, and that they do so not because the tax 
expertise of the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation is 
necessarily greater than their own, but because they know it is 
standard congressional practice to use the committee reports to 
resolve statutory ambiguities and to fill in statutory gaps. (The old 
tax-lawyer joke, that one should consult the statute only if the 
legislative history is unclear,4 is not entirely a joke.) Even the most 
expert of tax lawyers consult tax legislative history to determine 
legislative intent, and one would expect even the Justices with the 
greatest tax expertise to do the same for the same reason. Professors 
Brudney and Ditslear show that Justice Blackmun, with his unique 
tax background among his contemporaries on the Court, relied on tax 
legislative history only slightly less than his colleagues.5 This lends 
some support to my view; if using legislative history were primarily 
about expertise borrowing, Justice Blackmun presumably would have 
leaned much less heavily than the other Justices on tax writing 
committee reports. 
II.  TAX-SPECIFIC SUBSTANTIVE CANONS OF  
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Professors Brudney and Ditslear suggest that the Court’s use of 
tax-specific substantive canons of interpretation can be understood as 
a form of expertise borrowing6 and that Justice Blackmun’s tendency 
to invoke such canons much less than the other Justices can be 
explained by his greater tax expertise.7 That may be right, but I would 
 
 2. See id. at 1276–95. 
 3. See id. at 1277. 
 4. RICHARD SCHMALBECK & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 32 
(2d ed. 2007). 
 5. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 1, at 1275 tbl.9. 
 6. Id. at 1277. 
 7. Id. at 1301. But see Indopco, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992). In Justice 
Blackmun’s opinion for the Court, a substantive canon plays a crucial role: “In exploring the 
relationship between deductions and capital expenditures, this Court has noted the ‘familiar 
rule’ that ‘an income tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace and that the burden of clearly 
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suggest another possibility—that such canons tend to be worthless or 
worse, and that Justice Blackmun appreciated that fact more often 
than the other Justices. The objection to the canons—which will come 
as no surprise to fans of Karl Llewellyn8—is that canons often exist on 
opposite sides of the same question and that there is no policy 
justification for either of the competing canons. Compare, for 
example, the invocation in one Supreme Court tax opinion of “the 
principle disfavoring implied tax exemptions,”9 with the Court’s claim 
in another tax opinion that tax statutes “are construed most strongly 
against the government, and in favor of the taxpayer.”10 Professor 
Boris Bittker, probably the greatest legal scholar in the history of the 
federal income tax, had little use for either canon: “[I]t is far from 
clear why the Code should be construed strictly against either the 
taxpayer or the government.”11 
III.  WRITING HIGH-QUALITY TAX OPINIONS ON THE SUPREME 
COURT: PRE-JUDICIAL TAX EXPERTISE PREFERRED,  
BUT NOT REQUIRED 
Professors Brudney and Ditslear show that Justice Blackmun 
authored considerably more majority opinions in tax cases than any 
of his colleagues.12 They also suggest, and I agree, that his tax 
opinions are generally of high quality.13 Several of his opinions—
 
showing the right to the claimed deduction is on the taxpayer.’” Id. (quoting Interstate Transit 
Lines v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943)). 
 8. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or 
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950). 
 9. United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 356 (1988), quoted in Brudney & 
Ditslear, supra note 1, at 1268. 
 10. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917). Admittedly, Gould v. Gould is a bit long in 
the tooth, but it continues to have adherents on the federal courts. See, e.g., Sec. Bank Minn. v. 
Comm’r, 994 F.2d 432, 441 (8th Cir. 1993), nonacq. 1996-1 I.R.B. 6. 
 11. BORIS I. BITTKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 1.03[1], at 1–25 (3d ed. 2002). 
 12. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 1, at 1270. 
 13. See id. at 1273. I do have two quibbles, however. First, the fact that Justice Blackmun 
wrote seventeen dissents in tax cases (compared with thirty-four majority opinions) indicates 
that his views on tax cases were not overwhelmingly influential with his colleagues. See Brudney 
& Ditslear, supra note 1, at 1272 (dissents); id. at 1271 tbl.8 (majority opinions). Second, on 
occasion Justice Blackmun’s views in tax cases could be quite idiosyncratic. For example, in his 
dissent in Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983), Justice Blackmun 
argued for overturning the decades-old tax benefit rule (under which the occurrence of an event 
inconsistent with a deduction claimed in an earlier year requires an income inclusion in the year 
in which the inconsistent event occurs) in favor of a new approach (under which the occurrence 
of a later inconsistent event would require amending the return for the year in which the 
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including Commissioner v. Tufts,14 INDOPCO, Inc. v. 
Commissioner,15 and Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States16—
are landmarks in Supreme Court tax jurisprudence. In an insightful 
qualitative analysis of Justice Blackmun’s tax opinions, Professor 
Robert A. Green commented, “Many of Justice Blackmun’s tax 
opinions are legendary among tax lawyers and academics.”17 
Professor Green described Justice Blackmun’s multifaceted approach 
to interpreting the code: 
Justice Blackmun’s [tax] opinions . . . exemplif[y] a practical 
reasoning approach to statutory interpretation. . . . This approach 
does not rely exclusively on any single touchstone for interpretation. 
Rather, it relies on multiple arguments that draw on a broad range 
of evidence and considerations: the statutory text, legislative history, 
legislative purpose, post-enactment developments (including judicial 
and administrative precedents), and the practical consequences of 
alternative interpretations.18 
Although Justice Blackmun’s strong tax background helps 
explain the quantity and quality of his tax opinions—much as, a 
generation earlier, Justice Jackson’s tax career influenced his 
Supreme Court tax opinions19—it is noteworthy that Justices Marshall 
and O’Connor, without having extensive tax backgrounds, were able 
to write tax opinions held in similarly high regard by tax lawyers and 
academics. Neither wrote nearly as many tax opinions as Justice 
Blackmun,20 but my sense is that the average quality of their tax 
opinions is as high as that of Justice Blackmun’s, and there is some 
anecdotal evidence to suggest that my sense is widely shared. For 
example, Professor Stephen B. Cohen has opined that “[d]uring his 
 
deduction was claimed), id. at 422 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As Justice O’Connor noted in her 
majority opinion, “[N]one of the parties has suggested such a result, no doubt because the rule is 
so settled.” Id. at 380 (majority opinion). 
 14. Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983). 
 15. Indopco, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992). 
 16. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546 (1993). 
 17. Robert A. Green, Justice Blackmun’s Federal Tax Jurisprudence, 26 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 109, 110 (1998). 
 18. Id. at 130. 
 19. See Kirk J. Stark, The Unfulfilled Tax Legacy of Justice Robert H. Jackson, 54 TAX L. 
REV. 171, 172–73 (2001). 
 20. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 1, at 1271 tbl.8 (showing that Justice Blackmun 
authored thirty-four majority opinions in tax cases to Justice Marshall’s eighteen, and that 
Justice O’Connor was not among the four justices writing the highest percentage of majority 
opinions in tax cases during their tenures on the Court). 
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twenty-four years on the Supreme Court, Justice Marshall wrote 
better opinions on federal income taxation than any of his fellow 
justices.”21 In an article reviewing Justice O’Connor’s tax 
jurisprudence, Professor Myron C. Grauer has identified Justices 
Marshall, Blackmun, and O’Connor as the three Justices of recent 
decades who “have become known for authoring opinions in 
significant tax cases.”22 Professor Grauer described Justice O’Connor 
as possessing “a sophisticated understanding of the structure of our 
tax system” and “a faculty for explaining the development of an 
aspect of tax law in clear, almost hornbook-like prose.”23 Although 
the tax accomplishments of Justices Marshall and O’Connor take 
nothing away from Justice Blackmun’s accomplishments in the same 
field, it is interesting and gratifying to note that Justices without 
extensive pre-judicial tax backgrounds can write tax opinions that are 
highly regarded by tax experts. Tax law is undeniably complex, but 
Justices Marshall and O’Connor have demonstrated that it is not 
beyond the capacity of generalist judges and Justices to write 
thoughtful and sophisticated opinions in tax cases. 
IV.  A ROLE FOR QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
A great virtue of Professors Brudney and Ditslear’s primarily 
quantitative analysis of Supreme Court tax opinions is that it reveals 
trends and approaches that are easily missed under the tax lawyer’s 
usual qualitative approach to judicial opinions. On the other hand, 
qualitative approaches are superior to quantitative analysis in some 
respects (as I am sure Professors Brudney and Ditslear would readily 
agree). In particular, a quantitative approach may fail to identify a 
case of special significance, instead treating it as merely one of many 
data points. 
 
 21. Stephen B. Cohen, Thurgood Marshall: Tax Lawyer, 80 GEO. L.J. 2011, 2011 (1992). 
Highlights of Justice Marshall’s tax jurisprudence include Cottage Savings Ass’n v. 
Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991); Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212 (1988); 
and United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970). 
 22. Myron C. Grauer, Justice O’Connor’s Approach to Tax Cases: Could She Have Led the 
Court Toward a More Collaborative Role for the Judiciary in the Development of Tax Law?, 39 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 69, 70 (2007). 
 23. Id. at 71. Highlights of Justice O’Connor’s tax jurisprudence include her majority 
opinion in Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983); her concurrence in 
Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 317 (1983) (O’Connor, J., concurring); and her dissent in 
Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 704 (1989) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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As an example, Professors Brudney and Ditslear’s study does not 
mention what seems to me the most interesting and important story 
in Supreme Court tax jurisprudence in the past decade. In the 2001 
case of Gitlitz v. Commissioner,24 the Court reached an extremely 
taxpayer-favorable result in a case involving the interaction between 
the rules governing cancellations of indebtedness and the rules 
governing shareholder basis in the stock of S corporations. In an 
opinion written by Justice Thomas for an eight-member majority, the 
Court adopted a literal interpretation of the statutory language,25 
producing a structurally absurd tax benefit (the deduction of a tax 
loss not corresponding to any actual economic loss) clearly not 
contemplated by Congress. Justice Thomas needed just one sentence 
to dispose of the argument that Congress did not intend to confer 
such a benefit: “Because the Code’s plain text permits the taxpayers 
here to receive these benefits, we need not address this policy 
concern.”26 
Gitlitz was not a tax-shelter case; it was a case in which the 
taxpayer happened to stumble into an unreasonably favorable result 
not contemplated by Congress rather than a case in which the 
taxpayer planned a transaction to exploit a literal reading of the code 
at odds with legislative intent. Nevertheless, the Court must have 
been aware that the lower courts were being deluged with tax-shelter 
cases and that taxpayers would win most or all of those cases under 
Gitlitz’s literal interpretive approach The aggressive marketing of tax 
shelters combined with Gitlitz-style interpretation posed a threat to 
the fisc of the highest order.27 Observers concerned about the 
integrity of the federal tax structure awaited developments with 
trepidation. Much to their surprise (or at least to my surprise), the 
Gitlitz dog has never barked again in the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court has cited Gitlitz in no subsequent opinions, the Court 
has not granted certiorari in any tax-shelter cases, and in the lower 
courts the government has won almost all of its tax-shelter cases since 
 
 24. Gitlitz v. Comm’r, 531 U.S. 206 (2001). 
 25. Id. at 218. 
 26. Id. at 220. 
 27. See, e.g., Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem, 
Possible Solutions, and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 TAX L. REV. 325, 351 (2002) (“There 
was no tax shelter [in Gitlitz], in that the taxpayer did not look for a gap and then plan to take 
advantage of it. Nevertheless, this language in Gitlitz could indicate a more general view of the 
Court that taxpayers are free to take advantage of the Code as they find it.”). 
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2005.28 Perhaps the Court’s quiet retreat from the brink should be 
labeled a nonstory rather than a story, but if so it is by far the most 
important Supreme Court tax nonstory of this decade. It is not a 
story, however, that is likely to be uncovered by a quantitative study. 
V.  WHO THINKS TAX CASES ARE NOT INTERESTING, AND WHY? 
Professors Brudney and Ditslear note the widespread view 
among the Supreme Court Justices that tax cases are boring.29 
Whether or not Supreme Court tax cases are interesting is not a 
question that Professors Brudney and Ditslear investigate (sensibly 
enough), but I cannot resist taking this opportunity to comment on 
the topic. Although the view of tax cases as boring must be nearly 
universal among people who are not tax specialists, I suspect it is 
generally assumed that tax specialists have a different view. I hereby 
reveal a tax lawyers’ secret: we also think that most Supreme Court 
tax cases are boring these days. Unlike many of the workplace 
statutes, the Court’s interpretation of which Professors Brudney and 
Ditslear also investigate, the Internal Revenue Code is a mature 
statute (despite Congress’s never-ending tinkering). With rare 
exception, the big interpretive issues were decided decades ago, and 
what is left for the Court today are just some mundane interstitial 
questions. Tax lawyers do not think old Supreme Court tax cases are 
boring, and they do not think legislative and regulatory developments 
are boring, but they largely agree with the Court that the tax cases it 
considers today are less than riveting. To say that Supreme Court tax 
cases are dull is not, however, to say that tax law is dull. To borrow 
and adapt Norma Desmond’s famous remark in Sunset Boulevard: tax 
law is still big; it’s the cases that got small. 
 
 28. See, e.g., Kornman & Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 527 F.3d 443, 453 (5th Cir. 2008); 
Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, 515 F.3d 749, 753 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 
131 (2008); TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220, 231 (2d Cir. 2006); Coltec Indus., 
Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1261 (2007); 
Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 443 (4th Cir. 2006); Dow Chem. Co. v. 
United States, 435 F.3d 594, 605 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1251 (2007); Long Term 
Capital Holdings, LP v. United States, 150 F. App’x 40, 44 (2d Cir. 2005). The government has 
suffered one significant loss in this timeframe, in Sala v. United States, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 
1167 (D. Colo. 2008), but reversal on appeal seems likely. 
 29. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 1, at 1272–73 (“Some of the Justices likely deferred to 
Justice Blackmun simply because they were not interested in tax law—something Blackmun 
recognized inside the Court as well as in public statements.”). 
